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Abstract
In this paper we elaborate on the findings produced by an applied equilibrium model
that is used to calculate the annual efficiency gains from free international migration.
These findings suggest that we can expect significant gains from liberalizing
international labour flows. In particular, we expand on two implicit aspects of the
estimates: the actual number of migrants being generated by the various counter-factual
scenarios, and the per-migrant cost/benefits associated with each. These estimates are
then compared with contemporary migration flows and the findings of studies that
analyse their economic impact. In light of these comparisons, we conclude that our
original findings are not unreasonable.
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In the penultimate year of the Reagan presidency, the United
States expelled over a million illegal aliens and was decidedly
bullish about it. In the same year, the United States absorbed
over two hundred billion dollars worth of direct foreign
investment and was not even slightly sheepish about it.
Australia, Great Britain, and, indeed much of the civilized and
semi-civilized world has been doing much the same, albeit in a
little less dramatic fashion, for the past decade or in some cases
much more.
The message is clear enough. Had immigrants been
investments—had the people been money—their influx would
have been welcomed with open arms. Instead, it was deeply
resented and fiercely resisted.
Robert E. Goodin (1992:6)
‘If people were money…’ This is the provocative title to Robert Goodin’s opening salvo
in an edited collection entitled Free Movement. In raising this hypothetical question,
Goodin’s intent (and that of the edited volume that followed) was to provoke a moral
debate about the way in which the developed world has inconsistently prioritized
international financial capital mobility, while limiting international labour mobility.
It is, however, possible to raise Goodin’s question in a different light. Rather than focus
on the moral issues raised by the lack of international labour mobility, we might ponder
the economic consequences of allowing people the same freedom of mobility that we
now grant money (or, for that matter, goods and services). This sort of pondering leads
to two difficult and speculative questions that we address in the paper that follows:
‘What sort of economic gains might the world expect to reap by liberalizing world
labour markets?’ and ‘How realistic is the underlying framework used for estimating
these gains?’
In raising these types of questions, we do not wish to imply that a free-migration
scenario is likely, or that answers are easily obtainable or non-controversial. We are
fully aware of the practical, empirical and methodological difficulties in addressing such
speculative questions. In spite of these difficulties, the questions remain important and
relevant enough to warrant focused attention. Indeed, previous counter-factual analyses
and historical studies suggest that the gains could be very significant.
The relevance of the question is clearly evident when we juxtapose the lessons of two
research themes in contemporary political economy. On the one hand, there is an
established literature that links contemporary globalization to increased global income
divergence. On the other hand, there is a relatively new literature that links economic
integration and real wage convergence during an earlier (late nineteenth century) period
of globalization. When we recognize that the most striking difference separating these
two periods of globalization is the degree of labour mobility, we are left to wonder:
‘What if today’s globalization was also characterized by free labour mobility?’ The next
section juxtaposes these two literatures.
The main body of the paper expands on the findings of an applied equilibrium (AE)
model that was originally produced for the UNU/WIDER Conference on ‘Poverty,
International Migration and Asylum’. Although the model is not designed to address the
convergence question head-on, it generates estimates of the efficiency gains that the2
world might expect to reap from increased international migration. After a brief
introduction of that model (and its results), we turn to it to produce some new estimates
with the aim of providing a ‘reality check’ for the model.
In short, AE models provide us with analytical skeletons of the relationship between
international migration and economic growth. While these skeletons continue to
develop, our immediate ambition is to hang some empirical meat on them. In particular,
we wish to expand on two implicit aspects of the estimates being generated: the actual
number of migrants being generated by the various scenarios, and the per-migrant
cost/benefit associated with each. These estimates can then be compared with
contemporary migration flows and the findings of studies that analyse their economic
impact.
The results of these comparisons suggest that our model tends to generate very large
flows of migrants across international borders. Even in the most reasonable (1 per cent)
scenario, the model generates 44 million migrants (or about 5 per cent of the native
population in the developed world). In addition, we find that the worldwide efficiency
gains from this level of migration are also very large: indeed, they dwarf the anticipated
impact of some of today’s development strategies. Finally, the per-migrant gains
generated by our model are much larger than those generated by an influential study of
American conditions (Borjas 1999).
These comparisons encouraged us to adjust the model so that it would generate lower
per-migrant gains. In doing this, we found ourselves squeezed by empirical constraints
on the input side (with respect to the expected production efficiency differences
separating rich and poor countries) and empirical constraints on the output side of our
model (i.e., Borjas’ estimates of per-migrant surpluses). The resulting model is a
compromise that produces much smaller estimates for both migrant flows and efficiency
gains. Even in this model, however, we find that the estimated efficiency gains from
increasing migration are remarkably large.
We conclude by suggesting that the original model estimates are not unreasonable. If
forced to decide whether we should rely on the empirically-grounded input estimates of
the efficiency differences between richer and poorer regions (on the one hand), or
tweaking the model to produce lower per-migrant gains, we would choose the former.
As we adjust the model to produce lower estimates, the results become less plausible.
1 The puzzle
Two literatures in contemporary political economy provide the academic motivation for
the question at hand. The first links globalization and global income inequalities. The
second attributes income convergence in the late nineteenth century to cross-Atlantic
migration flows. In juxtaposing the conclusions of these two disparate literatures, we are
encouraged to ponder the convergence effects of international migration.
We begin with the literature that examines the economic consequences of contemporary
globalization. As late as 1820, per capita incomes were fairly similar around the world.
Of course, they were low (ranging from about US$ 500 in China and South Asia to
about US$ 1,000-1,400 in the richest countries in Europe); but they were equal. Indeed,3
the World Bank has estimated that roughly three-quarters of the world’s population then
lived on less than US$ 1 a day (World Bank 2000: 45).1 Since then, however, per capita
incomes have grown tremendously in the world’s richest countries (e.g., in Europe they
have grown more than tenfold in real terms), while incomes for the world’s vast
majority stagnated (indeed, by some measures, these have actually declined). Not
surprisingly, the result has been an increased spread in economic inequality.
Economic historians have long noted the growing income gap between rich and poor
nations.2 Kuznets’ classic (1966) Modern Economic Growth focused on how a small but
growing group of nations was able to combine industrialization, technical innovation
and institutional and political developments to produce impressive records of economic
growth. Later, Kuznets (1971) began to calculate the income differentials between rich
and poor countries, finding a significant increase over time. Bairoch (1971, 1982)
recorded similar findings. While the statistical material began to congeal, a consensus
developed over the increasing income gap separating rich from poor.3 As Glenn
Firebaugh (1999: 1601) has suggested: ‘Over the long haul, then—from the late
eighteenth century through much of the twentieth—national incomes diverged. No one
disputes that’.4
Influential international organizations (such as the World Bank, UNCTAD, and the
UNDP) have all referred to the growing international income gap, and placed it in the
context of contemporary globalization. These institutions have relied on a number of
indicators to prove the point—some more systematically than others. For example, the
World Bank (2000: 51) reports than in 1995, per capita GDP in the richest 20 countries
was 37 times higher that in the poorest countries—an increase from 18 in 1960. In a
similar fashion, UNCTAD (1997: 81) refers to an ‘enormous increase in the income gap
between the richest and poorest quintiles of world population’.5
The UNDP’s 1999 Human Development Report is probably the most influential
international report on income inequalities; it is the provocative focus for the current
flurry of statistical activity. While the UNDP report begins with a number of descriptive
statistics, the measure of income inequality that has received the most academic
attention is the UNDP’s income ratio. Using the ratio between the income of the quintile
of the world’s population living in the richest countries, and the income of the quintile
living in the poorest countries, the UNDP (1999: 3) found inequality increasing from
30:1 (in 1960) to 60:1 (in 1990), to 74:1 (in 1997).
This study has provoked resurgence in interest on the question of income inequalities
and its relationship to economic globalization, and a few critical voices have begun to
                                                
1 Figures are in constant 1990 US dollars, adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity.
2 And, of course, the post-war convergence among rich countries, ala Gerschenkron (1952), Abramovitz
(1979, 1986) and Maddison (1982, 1991).
3 For example, see Pritchett (1995); Sheehey (1996), Maddison (1995) and Sachs and Warner (1995).
See also the overview in Firebaugh (1999: table 1).
4 The exceptions, of course, are two: the postwar OECD and the Atlantic economy convergences. For
the latter, see the discussion below.
5 See the forward to Sala-i-Martin (2002) for an entertaining collection of what he sees to be the
exaggerated claims in this area.4
emerge. Most notably, Sala-i-Martin (2002) is critical of the ‘disturbing rise’ in claims
about global inequality.6 The conclusions generated by this latest wave of research are
less clear, as there are significant methodological and conceptual differences that
separate the studies.7 While these differences appear to be academically significant,
their political significance can be easily exaggerated. Even the most optimist accounts
of declining income inequalities show a very modest decline over time. In short, it is not
necessary to enter into the details of this debate to recognize that contemporary
globalization is not generating substantial income convergence.
This brings us to the second literature that motivates the current project. This work
explicitly engages the role of international labour mobility in the context of an earlier
period of globalization, and makes frequent references to the similarities to, and
differences with, contemporary globalization.
International labour mobility is one of the most striking differences that separate the
character of contemporary globalization from that of an earlier era. While the degree of
commercial and financial integration was relatively similar at the end of the nineteenth
and 20
th centuries, the previous bout of globalization was awash with enormous waves
of voluntary migration across the Atlantic.8 These migrants, totalling some 50 million in
the century following 1820, were unhindered by national immigration controls or
restrictions.9 Recent work by O’Rourke, Jeffrey Williamson, and Timothy Hatton links
substantial income convergence across the Atlantic economy to these waves of
international migrants.
In The Age of Mass Migration, Hatton and Williamson (1998) document the ways by
which mass migration contributed to the striking convergence of living standards found
in the poor and rich countries that straddled the Atlantic.10 Their comprehensive study
addresses several aspects of the great Atlantic migration, but their most interesting
finding (in the present context) is their conclusion that ‘mass migration accounted for
208 percent of the real wage convergence observed in the Atlantic economy between
1870 and 1910’ (1998: 227).11
                                                
6 See Melchior et al. (2000) for an earlier and similar version of this argument.
7 In particular, those studies that rely on market or official foreign exchange rates tend to support the
research conclusions of earlier scholars: there has been a growing increase in income inequalities
since the 1960s. However, those who rely on purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate
calculations find a slight decrease in inequality since the 1960s. In addition, many of the conclusions
in these studies hinge critically on whether or not China is included (and the weight it is given).
8 For some explicit comparisons of the two periods of globalization, see James (2001); O’Rourke and
Williamson (1999); Bordo et al. (1999).
9 This is not to deny that there were/are significant economic and social costs associated with
international migration. The migration figure comes from Hatton and Williamson (1998: 7).
10 This experience stands in rough contrast to developments beyond the Atlantic economy. There appears
to be no evidence of convergence when central, south and east European countries are added. Nor
does the evidence improve when China, Egypt, India, Turkey and the rest of Asia and the Middle East
are added to the analysis (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 25).
11 The percentage convergence explained is the counterfactual-actual ratio of change in ln[dispersion].
The large numbers are explained by the fact that the convergence effect of labor migration may be
offset by the divergence effects of other factors. The total convergence effects will, of course, sum to
100 per cent. See Hatton and Williamson (1998: 228ff) for a discussion.5
This is not to ignore the important effects of other forms of market integration. In a
related study, O’Rourke and Williamson (1999: 165) estimated that the effects of mass
migration on wage convergence were more modest (just 125 percent) in light of the
influence of other international factors (e.g., capital mobility). This study explicitly
searches for the influence of other integration factors (i.e., trade, finance and capital
market integration), but with little success. They argue that, ‘[i]n theory, the forces of
late-nineteenth-century convergence should have included commodity price
convergence and trade expansion, technological catch-up and human capital
accumulation, but in fact mass migration was the central force’ (ibid).
The effect of this potent cocktail of global factors is best illustrated in the remarkable
Scandinavian catch-up at the turn of the last century. Scandinavia suffered from very
high levels of emigration (especially in Norway), but it also enjoyed substantial inflows
of international capital. As a result, real wages in Scandinavia managed to grow at
almost three times the rate of those in the European industrial core (O’Rourke and
Williamson 1999: 19).
While a ‘capital-chasing labour offset’ is an important component of the income
convergence that characterized the Atlantic economy during the last era of
globalization, our focus will remain firmly trained on the dominant position played by
labour migration. This focus reflects a practical compromise until a model can be
produced where capital and labour flows more accurately reflect the historical record
(i.e., as complements, not substitutes).12 In the meantime, we take refuge in O’Rourke
and Williamson’s (1999: 166) observation: ‘The convergence power of free migration,
when it is tolerated, can be substantial given the late-nineteenth-century evidence.
Convergence based on technological or accumulation catch-up in closed economy
models miss the point. The millions on the move in the late nineteenth century did not’.
It is in the context of comparing the convergence effects from two different periods of
globalization that the potential economic gains from increased international labour
mobility become relevant. Of course, to agree that a question is relevant or important is
not to agree about how to answer it. We suggest that a well-grounded AE model is a
first step in the right direction.
2 Background analysis
In this section we introduce a model that produced our analytical point of departure. We
then adjust the model to generate some new estimates—estimates that are more readily
comparable with existing research in the field. In particular, we use the model to run
five scenarios covering different levels of migration; we then generate estimates of the
number of migrants and the economic costs/benefits associated with each of these
scenarios.
                                                
12 The lack of capital mobility in this model likely exaggerates the returns/losses for labor and capital in
both sending and receiving countries. Since we expect capital to follow labor (as it did in the previous
era of globalization); the migration effect on the real wage in both regions will be attenuated.
Likewise with respect to the returns on capital: in receiving countries, capital inflows will mute the
rise in the return to capital; in sending countries, capital outflows will mute the fall in return to capital.
See Hatton and Williamson (1994: 22ff), for a description of these effects in the nineteenth century.6
In 1984, Hamilton and Whalley developed the first AE model for calculating the
efficiency gains from increased international migration flows. This relatively simple
model produced phenomenal results: finding that the annual gains from free labour
mobility could exceed the (then) worldwide GDP. In particular, their unadjusted
estimates produced gains that ranged from US$ 4.7 to US$ 16 trillion, at a time (1977)
when worldwide GNP was just US$  7.82 trillion (Hamilton and Whalley 1984:
Table 4).
Conceptually, Hamilton and Whalley’s argument can be divided into three parts. First,
they assume there is a fixed supply of (worldwide) labour and full employment
throughout the world. This labour supply, fully employed, produces a single output that
is homogeneous across regions. Second, they use (regional) CES production functions
to estimate differences in the marginal productivity of labour (MPL) across regions.
These differences are assumed to be the result of barriers to mobility. Finally, they
estimate how labour would reallocate in the absence of these barriers and measure the
associated efficiency gains. In short, Hamilton and Whalley assume that wage rate
equalization is achieved through unimpeded international labour flows (not via the
traditional factor price equalization theorem). An outline of their method is provided in
Table 1.
Table 1
Method for calculating global efficiency effects of modifying immigration controls
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−   where  i is a constant (defining units of measurement),  i is a weighting parameter,   i = 1/(1
+   i) is the elasticity of substitution between factor inputs, Ki and Li are capital and labour
service inputs, and Yi is value added in region i.
−   The elasticity of substitution,   = 1/(1+  ), is assumed to range from 0.5 to 1.5 (where   is the
substitution parameter). As  1, the CES tends to the Cobb Douglas function; and as  0
it tends toward the Leontief (fixed coefficient function). Obviously, where  =1 or  =0, the
functions are undefined.
−   From the assumption that factors receive their marginal product in each region in the




































−   Units are assumed for the output produced in each region such that one unit sells for
US$ 1. The GDP value for the region, Ki, Li,  i, and  i are used to solve for  i.
−   An iterative procedure is then used to calculate the change in labour allocation after a
modification of immigration controls consistent with: (a) equalized MPL in all regions; and
(b) full employment of the fixed labour supply.
Source: Moses and Letnes (2002).7
Table 2
1977-98 Comparison of efficiency gains
Comparison of annual worldwide efficiency gains from global removal of immigration controls – unadjusted
and adjusted 3-region calculations (US$ trillion)
Elasticities of substitution in production in all regions























































PW - Population workforce adjustment.
EU3 & EU5 - Labour efficiency units correction using factors of 1:3 and 1:5 for the medium and
low human development regions, respectively.
Source: Moses and Letnes (2002).
Formally, Hamilton and Whalley generated marginal revenue product schedules directly
from aggregate production functions for seven world regions. For each region they
constructed a CES production function where they specified the substitution parameter,
ρi. This implies a value for the elasticity of factor substitution in production for each
region. To determine the weighting parameters, δi, they determined the first-order
conditions for cost minimization, used observations on factor use and factor returns in
each region, and assumed that factors were paid their marginal products before the
immigration controls were removed. The scale parameter, γ i, was then determined in the
production function for each region. These estimated production function parameters
were then used to calculate the change in labour allocation across regions after the
removal of immigration controls. In the removal case, an equalized marginal revenue
product of labour across regions was found, consistent with full employment of the
fixed worldwide labour supply.
In a recent paper, we overhauled Hamilton and Whalley’s analysis to provide more
contemporary measures of the potential economic gain from liberating national labour
markets.13 Relying on an updated model and data for three world regions, we found that
both the efficiency and the distributional gains from liberalizing world labour markets
remain significant. These estimates are similar to those produced by Iregui (2003) in her
contribution to the UNU/WIDER conference (at the point where they are comparable),
though her model is more sophisticated and addresses different conceptual scenarios.
                                                
13 Moses and Letnes (2002). We refer the interested reader to this piece to trace the architecture and
mechanics of the model employed below.8
In particular, the world efficiency gains derived from a full relaxation of migration
controls could be as high as US$ 3.4 trillion. As world GDP in 1998 was substantially
larger than in 1977, our diachronic comparison in Table 2 compares the unadjusted and
adjusted results in terms of relative GDP. Here we see a substantial increase in
efficiency gains over time, especially in the adjusted cases. Indeed, in our middle
scenario—where elasticities of substitution were set to one in all regions—we find that
the relative gains increased from 7.5 per cent to 9.6 per cent of world GDP over the
intervening 21 years.
Another important result from this analysis is that the largest efficiency gains are reaped
in the initial phases (or smallest levels) of migration. For example, a ten percent
elimination of wage differentials (our surrogate for a 10 per cent increase in migration)
generates about 23 per cent of the total potential gain.14 This has enormous political
significance, as it suggests that even a small liberalization of national labour market
controls could bring substantial economic gain.
3A  n e w  t u r n
The problem with AE analyses is that they remain hopelessly speculative. For example,
the analysis sketched above provides no clear picture of how many migrants are being
generated by the different scenarios, or (consequently) how the size of these flows relate
to existing levels of international migration. As many of the adjustment mechanisms are
internal to the model itself, there are few explicit reference points onto which the
empirically-minded reader might grab.
This section will develop two important aspects of the model. We begin by mapping the
size of the migrant flows necessary for the model to generate the sort of gains reported.
Once quantified, we can compare these projections against current migration levels.
With migration figures in hand, we can then estimate the per-migrant gains generated by
the model (and how they are distributed), and these estimates can then be compared to
others. By producing these kinds of estimates we hope to provide a better empirical
reference point from which we can evaluate the model.
To generate these new estimates, we consider five scenarios from our previous analysis.
Considering that the relative size of the efficiency gain varies with the level of
immigration, and that the largest gains are generated in the initial levels of migration,
we focus on four potential scenarios that correspond to an increasing liberalization of
migration controls (1 per cent, 10 per cent, 30 per cent and 100 per cent
liberalization).15 In addition, we add a baseline scenario that represents today’s level of
international migration. Obviously, readers who are less inclined to speculation should
focus on the first three scenarios (0 per cent, 1 per cent and 10 per cent increase). In
order to run these new scenarios, we fix the adjustable parameters in the model, relying
                                                
14 C.f., Moses and Letnes (2002: Table 7a) [i.e., elasticity of substitution in production in all regions = 1,
population workforce adjustment and labor efficiency units correction (using factors of 1:3 and 1:5),
adjusted 3-region calculation]
15 Actually, the model is simply producing estimates of the consequences of a 1 per cent, 10 per cent, 30
per cent and 100 per cent elimination of wage differentials. We use this as a surrogate for labor market
liberalization.9
on estimates grounded in the broader empirical literature. In practice, this means we
assume that elasticities of substitutions are equal to one across all three regions, and we
adjust the model for efficiency (1:3 and 1:5 for the medium and low HD regions
respectively) and workforce (0.48, 0.41, and 0.41 for the High, Medium and Low HD
regions respectively) concerns.16
3.1 Migrant flows
The first step is to generate estimates of the size of the migrant flows that are associated
with the different scenarios produced by the model. As noted earlier, these gains are
reaped unevenly across migration levels: the largest efficiency gains (in relative terms)
are for the initial units of migrating labour, since the marginal product differences are
largest in the initial stages of development. In other words, we found that a substantial
portion of the total gains can be generated by a relatively small relaxation of
international migration controls.
With the basic model in place, we ran four counterfactual scenarios; the results of which
are presented in Table 3. The 0 per cent scenario takes the actual level of migration as
its point of departure. These figures correspond to the UN Population Division’s (2001:
139) estimate for the average annual net number of migrants over 1990-2000. Although
the UN Population Division’s regional categories do not directly overlap with our own,
the discrepancy with our three-region aggregation is small.17 This provides us with a
good starting point for evaluating the size of the migrant flows under the various
scenarios. The estimated number of migrants for each scenario and region are found on
the left side of the table; on the right side are the estimated efficiency gains. The figures
in parentheses represent the reference ratio value: i.e., the ratio of the regional
population18 and the regional GDP for each estimate.
So what do these figures tell us? Let us begin with the left side of the table. For starters
we know that even a small increase in the migration level (1 per cent) corresponds to a
phenomenally large increase in the number of migrants (given the benchmark figure of
2.48 million). In particular, the first (1 per cent) scenario depends on about 44 million
people emigrating from the low and medium developed countries to the developed
world. The second (10 per cent) scenario depends on 432 million people moving
(roughly divided between low and medium sending countries). The practical obstacles
associated with the 100 per cent scenario are clearly evident when we note that about
two-thirds of the medium human development (MHD) population (ca. 2.4 billion
people) will find incentives to migrate in this scenario.
                                                
16 See Moses and Letnes (2002) for our justification in choosing these parameters.
17 A second caveat is in order. Our dataset contains only 120 countries, while the UN includes all
countries of the world. On both counts, the differences are not large and should not affect the outcome
of our estimations. A more detailed description of this, or any other, aspect of the analysis can be
obtained by contacting the authors.
18 The total population is only 5.11 trillion, as we do not have data on all countries in the world.10
Table 3
Migrant size and efficiency gains, five scenarios
Scenario Number of migrants [millions] Efficiency gains [billions]





































































Reference 740 3,440 930 940 12,920 21,450 31,310
Notes: HHD = High human development states;
MHD = Medium human development states;
LHD = Low human development states.
The reference figures are each region’s population and PPP GNP. Figures in parentheses ( ) are
the relative ratios, based on the respective reference value (regional population) and (regional
GDP).
Source: Actual migrant figures (in the 0% scenario) come from the UN Population Division (2001);
Population and GNP figures are from Moses (2002: Table 2).
To contextualize these figures, we can estimate the size of the (e/i)mmigrant flow as a
percentage of a given region’s population. Thus, today’s immigrant stream into the high
human development (HHD) world constitutes just .3 per cent of the domestic population
in that region. With the one percent scenario (44.15 million people) the relative size of
the inflow remains fairly small: just 4.7 per cent of the population in the HHD world. In
the 10 per cent scenario, however, the number of immigrants to the developed world is
approaching half of the existing population, with the largest share of the sending
country population coming from the poorest countries (nearly 30 per cent of the low
human development (LHD) population is emigrating).19
Another measure of relative influence can be derived by returning to Goodin’s
hypothetical question: what if people were money? Following Goodin’s approach, we
can compare each region’s relative reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI) with the
relative size of the projected migrant flows in each scenario (Goodin 1992: 14). In this
light, the number of migrants is rather large—even in the smallest (1 per cent) scenario.
For example, the size of the FDI flow into the HHD region constitutes about 2.4 per
cent of its real GDP (whereas they are only 0.9 per cent and 0.5 per cent in the MHD
and LHD scenarios, respectively). In other words, by adopting the 1 per cent scenario,
the richest countries would be accepting a level of immigration that is relatively higher
                                                
19 An equal number of workers come from the MHD region in this scenario, but they only represent
about 6 per cent of that region’s population.11
than its current reliance on foreign capital.20 This volume of migration is large in a
historical context as well: e.g., Simon (1999: 28) shows that working-age immigration
to the US, at its peak in 1910, represented only 2.8 per cent of the native population.21
We can now turn to the right side of the table, and consider the efficiency gains
associated with each scenario. It is our analytical ambition to map the gains that might
be reaped by a relaxation of immigrant controls. In today’s political context, however,
the more reasonable scenario may be to consider the costs associated with closing off
international migration all together. The first (0 per cent) scenario estimates the
efficiency gains associated with today’s level of international immigration (i.e., 2.39
million migrants), and suggests that the existing situation benefits the world by about
US$  32 billion (or 0.1 per cent of world GDP). Should immigration be radically
curtailed, it would appear that the largest losers would reside in the richest countries, as
it is here that the model generates the largest gains (US$ 38 billion).
In the other four scenarios, gains accumulate for the HHD region, and these are
substantial at the higher migration scenarios. This is a function of the simple model
employed. Still, this result is rather counter-intuitive, given the nature of much political
debate about restricting immigration (and in light of the existing studies on the impact
of immigration into developed countries). In the 1 per cent scenario, the world
economic gain is estimated at US$ 84 billion, or 0.3 per cent of the world’s (1998)
GDP. The gains jump considerably when we consider the 10 per cent scenario—here
the world can expect to enjoy a US$  774 billion windfall by allowing 432 million
people to migrate
How large are these gains relative to the impact of other development strategies? When
we contrast the (US$ 84 billion) gain generated by the 1 per cent scenario against the
estimated gains associated with alternative development strategies, the difference are
both large and illuminating. For example, official development assistance from the
OECD’s DAC countries was estimated to be about US$ 51.4 billion in 2001,22 and the
IMF’s current plan for debt relief will cancel just US$ 40 billion of debt (IMF 2002)! If
our estimates are correct, a small increase of international migration could produce
economic gains that would surpass the target values of two important poverty relief
strategies.
On the other hand, other liberalization schemes are expected to generate even larger
effects—closer in size to those produced by our 10 per cent scenario. For example, the
UNDP (2000: 4) suggests that developing countries loose annual agricultural export
earnings to the tune of US$ 700 billion because of tariff and non-tariff barriers. In this
context, a 10 per cent liberalization of migration controls might produce the same sort
of economic gain as a full liberalization of agricultural trade. Finally, FDI to the
                                                
20 Of course, one can question whether this is the appropriate indicator. We are simply following,
Goodin’s (1992) lead, in using FDI inflows/GDP. If we consider the relative (FDI) stock, the share is
much larger: 13.1 per cent (HHD), 6.0 per cent (MHD) and 4.7 per cent (LHD).
21 On the other hand, the reader will recall that the last period of globalization experienced 50 million
Atlantic migrants (stretched out over a century), at a time when the world population was significantly
smaller.
22 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the OECD deals
with issues related to co-operation with developing countries. DAC assistance accounts for at least 95
per cent of worldwide ODA. See OECD (2001a and 2001b).12
developing world in the year 2000 totalled US$  1.9 trillion (Letnes 2002: 47), a
significantly larger sum of money. In both these latter examples, the gains are closer in
magnitude to those produced by our 10 per cent scenario, but will likely have very
different distributional consequences.
3.2 Per-migrant benefit
Now that we have estimated the size of the migrant flows and efficiency gains
associated with each scenario, we can produce estimates of the costs/benefits associated
with each. These estimates can then be compared against estimates generated by other,
related, studies.
For our reference value, we rely on a formula used by Borjas’ (1995, 1999) work on the
US’s ‘immigration surplus’:
-½sem
2, ( 1 )
where  s is labour’s share of national income, e is the drop in native wages due to
migration, and m represents the share of the labour force which is foreign born
(1995: 7).
Borjas estimates that the immigrant surplus for the United States was about 10 billion
dollars at the end of the millennium.23 As this estimate relies on migrant stocks (i.e.,
share of the foreign-born population), not annual immigrant flows, an estimate of the
‘per-migrant’ gain to the United States can be generated by dividing this surplus by the
number of foreign born residents (ca. 25 million): a mere US$ 400 per immigrant.
To expand on the American example, we can employ the same percentage figure (i.e.,
0.1 per cent of GDP)24 to the larger sample of HHD countries. By employing the same
formula to comparable OECD data (where data are available), we can expect that the
immigrant surplus for the OECD sample to be about US$ 23.4 billion.25 As there were
56.7 million foreign-born residents in this sample group,26 the per-migrant surplus for
the developed (OECD) world can be estimated at US$ 413.
These estimates are very small compared to the sort of per-migrant gains generated by
our model. The simplest way to calculate these figures is to divide the number of
migrants generated in each scenario by its estimated efficiency gain. As Table 4
illustrates, these per-migrant gains can be broken down by region. From these figures it
would appear that the relative gain/loss per migrant changes little from scenario to
scenario: the richest countries tend to benefit by about US$ 3,600 per migrant, whereas
                                                
23 In the United States case, Borjas argues s =0.7, e = -0.3, and m = 0.1, so that the US immigrant surplus
is about 0.1 per cent of US GDP (which was ca. 10 trillion dollars in 1998). See Borjas (1999: 87, 91).
24 We use the same percentage figure, as the labor share, wage effects and migrant share data are
relatively similar in the broader OECD sample. In particular, if we assume that s = .687 (Gollin
(2002), 2
nd adjustment); e = -0.3 (same as Borjas); m = 0.07 (Coppel et al. 2001: 10): we still end up
with the same figure: 0.001. See Moses and Letnes (2002) for a justification of the choice of values.
25 Total GDP for this sample is US$ 23.4 trillion (OECD Main Economic Indicators).
26 Coppel et al. (2001: 10).13
the middle-income and poorest countries tend to loose (about US$ 1,000 and US$ 2,700
respectively).
Despite the different results produced by these two approaches, they build on
remarkably similar foundations. Central to each approach is the elasticity of factor
prices for labour (i.e., e in equation 1). From his research on the US case, Borjas (1999:
91) estimated that a 10 per cent increase in immigrants would reduce the native wage by
about 3 per cent.27 This figure is remarkably similar to the estimates generated by our
model, as evidenced in Table 5: in the 10 per cent scenario, our model generates a
decline in wage rates to the non-migrant population of the HHD at 3.1 per cent. What is
perhaps the most surprising observation in Table 5, however, is the fact that a full
liberalization of migration controls (which would unleash a migrant flow of about three
billion people!) would only decrease HHD wages by 17.6 per cent! If accurate, this
seems a relatively small price to pay for the sort of efficiency gains that are generated
by the model.28
Table 4
Per-migrant cost/benefit, four scenarios
Per-migrant cost (-) or benefit (+), US$ 
Scenario LHD MHD HHD
1% -885 -2,592 3,511
10% -921 -2,606 3,556
30% -1,002 -2,675 3,647
100% -1,167 -3,004 3,687
Table 5
Effect on labour and capital returns, four scenarios
% Change in wage rates to non-migrating
labour
% Change in return to capital by region
Scenario LHD MHD HHD LHD MHD HMD
1% 1.1 0.2 -0.3 -2.3 -0.4 0.7
10% 11.4 2.1 -3.1 -21.0 -4.4 7.2
30% 37.3 8.0 -8.5 -50.2 -15.6 20.8
100% 155.2 44.1 -17.6 -87.1 -55.2 52.8
3.3 A new twist
Borjas’ approach for estimating per-migrant surpluses suggests that our own estimates
are too large: almost nine times larger! In light of this observation, we thought it would
be worthwhile to run our model with new efficiency adjustments in order to produce
                                                
27 Borjas, in turn, builds on Hamermesh (1993).
28 To put this in a comparative context, the OECD estimates that the cumulative effects of an ageing
population in the EU will reduce its living standards by about 18 per cent (Turner et al. 1998). In other
words, the developed world might expect an 18 per cent drop in living standards if immigration
doesn’t occur! See Coppel et al. (2001: 20ff).14
lower per-migrant efficiency gains. This model can then be used to generate new
estimates of the migration flows and efficiency gains associated with each of the
scenarios used above.
This strategy is not without difficulties.29 First of all, it is important to recall that our
own (original) efficiency adjustments were already grounded in the empirical literature.
In particular, Acemoglu and Ziliboth (2001: 593) find that the difference in output per
worker between rich and poor countries in their sample ranges from between 1:2 and
1:5 (most of the variance results from the different models being tested). On the basis of
their study, we argued that the most reasonable efficiency adjustments between the
HHD region and the MHD region would be 1:3, between the LHD region and the HHD
region: 1:5.30 Thus, in order to produce the sort of per-migrant efficiency gains
generated by Borjas’ approach, we need to assume that the efficiency differences
separating rich and poor countries of the world are much larger than is usually assumed
(and verified empirically).
Worse, the model’s interpretative utility sinks drastically when we try to amplify the
efficiency differences sufficiently to produce estimates of the same magnitude as
generated by Borjas’ approach (i.e., US$  413). In fact, when these efficiency
adjustments are raised too high, people in our model start migrating from the HHD to
the MHD. This simply will not do!31 As a result, we have chosen to run the model with
efficiency adjustments on the order of 1:5 and 1:10 (the HHD:MHD and HHD:LHD
efficiency ratios, respectively). These are the largest efficiency adjustments that the
model would embrace without producing implausible migration back-flow (from rich
countries to poor countries).
With these new efficiency adjustments, our model produces per-migrant efficiency
gains that are somewhere between the estimates generated by Borjas’ approach
(US$ 413) and those of our original model (see Table 6). For example, the per-migrant
gains to the HHD world are generally about US$ 1,500, compared to the US$ 3,500
dollar gain in the original model (c.f. Table 4). Note, however, that the per-migrant
losses in both the LHD and MHD worlds have not changed much from the scenario
depicted in Table 4.
These larger efficiency adjustments (and smaller per-migrant gains) correspond to much
lower levels of international migration and smaller overall efficiency gains. Table 7
represents the equivalent of Table 3, but with estimates generated on the basis of the
                                                
29 An alternative strategy is to freeze the model and simply paste Borjas’ per-migrant gains onto our
model’s estimates for the number of migrants in each scenario. This would produce lower, but still
quite significant, efficiency gains. For example, in the 10 per cent scenario, the world efficiency gain
would be estimated to be about US$ 178 billion (e.g., 432,190,000 migrants, each generate US$ 413).
30 In the original Hamilton and Whalley (1984) piece, even smaller efficiency adjustments (1:2 and 1:3)
were employed.
31 The model uses the efficiency factor to reduce the incentive to migrate as it increases the MPL in the
MHD and the LHD regions. For this reason, these regions will—at certain efficiency factors—have
higher MPLs than the HHD region. This explains the out-migration. It should be possible to redesign
the model such that the increased efficiency factors will only reduce the efficiency gains—this would
allow us to overcome this counter-intuitive result, and increase the efficiency adjustments even more.
However this ‘solution’ would not address the underlying problem of adopting efficiency adjustments
that are much larger than those justified by the empirical literature.15
new efficiency adjustments. Compared to the original model, we see that an even larger
share of the overall anticipated gain is generated at the initial stages of migration.32
Equally significant is the fact that the 1 per cent scenario seems less politically
threatening—as it relies on just 12 million people moving to the developed world (or
about 1.3 per cent of the HHD population). This relatively small amount of people can
be expected to generate an efficiency gain of about US$ 18 billion in the HHD region.
Obviously, these new efficiency adjustments produce much lower returns to both capital
and labour in each of the various scenarios—as evidenced in Table 8. In the 1 per cent
scenario, the effect on factor returns is almost nothing. Indeed, in all of these scenarios,
the anticipated (negative) effect on wages is muted. This is a problem when we recall
that Borjas finds a 10 per cent increase in emigration leading to a 3 per cent drop in the
native wage in the HHD region (as did our original model). The new model’s estimates
are nowhere near this level of elasticity. Indeed, even in our 100 per cent scenario,
workers in the developed world cannot expect that kind of fall in their wages! In return,
workers in the poorest countries can expect a phenomenal (50.7 per cent) increase in
their wages! Of course, the flip side of this reward is that domestic capital owners in the
developing world experience a whopping decline in their expected rate of return.
In both versions of our model, the distributional shortcomings are clearly evident: all the
efficiency gains are accrued in the developed world. Given the simple nature of the
underlying model, this outcome is difficult to avoid. Nevertheless, we doubt that this is
the case in practice. We can think of several reasons why emigration might improve
economic conditions in the developing world—but the form of the current model does
not afford us much opportunity for incorporating them.33 Future models will need to
address this important shortcoming if we are to come to grips with the potential impact
of migration on development.
Table 6
Reduced per-migrant cost/benefit (efficiency correction 1:5 & 1:10)
Per-migrant cost (-) or benefit (+), US$ 
Scenario LHD MHD HHD
1% -905 -2,770 1,483
10% -895 -2,576 1,486
30% -932 -2,583 1,537
100% -1,033 -2,604 1,722
                                                
32 In the original model, a 1 per cent liberalization of migration secures 2.5 per cent of the total
anticipated gain (see Table 3). In the new model, the 1 per cent scenario corresponds to a 2.9 per cent
share of the anticipated gain. Indeed, 63 per cent of the total anticipated gain in the new model can be
captured by just a 30 per cent liberalization.
33 As Riccardo Faini’s contribution describes, some authors have argued that the incentive to acquire
skills may be strengthened by the prospect of being able to migrate. On another front, the historical
record is quite clear about the European wage-benefit associated with emigration in the late nineteenth
century. Finally, it has been estimated that migrants send home, on average, about US$ 1,000 a year in
the form of remittances (Harris 2000: 98). If the level of remittances is this high, the per-emigrant gain
to the sending country could be nearly as large as the per-migrant efficiency gain generated by the
revised model (ca. US$ 1,500).16
Table 7
Reduced migrant size and efficiency gains (efficiency correction 1:5 & 1:10)
Number of migrants [millions] Efficiency gains [billions]





































































Reference 740 3,440 930 940 12,920 21,450 31,310
Note: See Table 3 and text for clarification and sources.
Table 8
Reduced effect on labour and capital returns (efficiency correction 1:5 & 1:10)
% Change in wage rates to non-migrating labour % Change in return to capital by region
Scenario LHD MHD HHD LHD MHD HMD
1% 0.5 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.1
10% 4.9 0.1 -0.4 -10.0 -0.2 0.8
30% 14.9 0.4 -1.0 -26.2 -0.9 2.2
100% 50.7 2.1 -2.7 -59.3 -4.5 6.1
Although our model focuses on the estimated efficiency gains from increased labour
migration, it is important to remember that the underlying logic of the approach assumes
dramatic international wage convergence. In this model, workers will continue to move
as long is there is an international wage gap to exploit. This convergence alone will
generate very important distributional consequences that are not particularly evident in
our results.
4 Conclusion
We can now provide a provisional answer to Goodin’s opening query. If people were
money, and enjoyed the same freedom of mobility enjoyed by finance today, the world
could expect an efficiency gain as high as US$ 3.4 trillion. This is an enormous windfall
which could have phenomenal consequences for economic development and global
income convergence. However, these consequences hinge critically on their
distribution—an aspect of the model which remains underdeveloped.
The main objective of this paper has been to try and provide the model with some better
empirical grounding, from which we can evaluate the reasonableness of its estimates. In17
this context, our focus has been on two important aspects of the model: the number of
migrants being generated by various scenarios, and the estimated per-migrant benefit
associated with them. Along both of these fronts, it appears as though the model
produces very large estimates. The number of migrants associated with each scenario
makes even the smallest scenario politically untenable. Worse, the per-migrant gains
being generated are almost nine times larger than those being generated by other
studies.
Although the efficiency gains from the original model are large, they stand on
reasonable empirical assumptions about the relative efficiency differences that separate
rich and poor countries. When we modify the model to produce smaller per-migrant
gains, we end up challenging these assumptions and generating migration flows which
are clearly unreasonable (e.g., from rich to poorer countries). In this light, we wonder if
the original model is not producing better estimates of the anticipated gain. Seen from a
different perspective, this light might cast a shadow over the relatively small size of the
immigrant surplus generated by Borjas’ approach.
Even if we accept the modified model, in spite of its evident shortcomings, the
estimated gains from increased migration remain significant (albeit lower). Liberalizing
immigration restrictions may provide the fastest and easiest ways of diminishing
international wage gaps. We are, after all, talking about a significant amount of new
wealth being generated by matching international supply with its potential demand.
These are the same sort of lessons being generated by newer economic history on the
role played by labour migration during the previous era of globalization. To better
understand these lessons, we believe that a better AE model can be constructed—one
built on more realistic foundations—in order to document the potential gains and their
distribution.
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